Greenspan claims that modern financial innovations, especially financial derivatives, were major contributors to a Schumpeterian process of 'creative destruction' which produced a high-growth 'New Economy' and opposes their regulation. A different perspective emerges when it is recognised that the 'New Economy' followed the general contours of a Schumpeterian business cycle, and the role of modern financial innovations is examined in that context. The authors argue that the primary role of financial derivatives has been in contributing to 'reckless finance' and speculative excesses in the second phase of that cycle, and that Schumpeter would favour subjecting the use of derivatives to more regulation.
Introduction
As financial innovations have proliferated over the last several decades, economists have differed over their economic effects, and especially over the appropriate regulatory policies for financial derivatives, the most controversial of these innovations. In studies that applied the analytical perspectives of the 'old' American institutionalism of Thorstein Veblen (Raines and Leathers, 1992) and Hyman Minsky's financial fragility theory (Carter, 1989) , modern financial innovations were shown to encourage speculation and financial instability, thus establishing the need for greater regulation. In contrast, Alan Greenspan has presented a free market defence of financial innovations based on Joseph A. Schumpeter's theory that innovations initiate a dynamic process of 'creative destruction' in a capitalistic system (1997C, 2000E, 2000F) . In that context, Greenspan claims that innovative financial products, and particularly financial derivatives, played a major role in the emergence of a high-growth 'New Economy ' (1997D, 1998B, 1999A, 2000C) , and opposes government regulation of their use (1997A, 1998A, 2000A, 2000D) .
As Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Greenspan's interpretation of the Schumpeterian role of financial innovations in the 'New Economy' has had important consequences. It had an influence on the Fed's passive response to the emergence of a speculative bubble in the financial markets, on the one hand, and its proactive response to the collapse of a large hedge fund which suffered huge losses on derivative contracts, on the other. It was reflected in Greenspan's testimonies that influenced the US Congress to exempt over-the-counter financial derivatives from government regulation and to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act's separation of commercial and investment banking. But, as we show in this paper, that interpretation is seriously flawed. Schumpeter's theoretical and historical analyses of business cycles support the Institutionalist and Post Keynesian assessments of the role of modern financial innovations in the 'New Economy' rather than Greenspan's.
Relevance of Schumpeter's business cycle analyses
Schumpeter's business cycle analyses are relevant to the 'New Economy' for two reasons. First, he emphasised how differently the financial sector functions in the first and second phases or waves of a cycle. In the 'primary wave', a growth spurt in the real economy occurs when banks create credit to finance entrepreneurial ventures that introduce new products or new processes that increase productivity. A 'secondary wave' of general prosperity is induced by entrepreneurs' spending for the construction and operation of their new ventures, but is carried forward by speculative spending, made possible by the spread of easy credit to all parts of the economy. When the cycle ends in recession, the downturn is amplified by large liquidations resulting from the speculative excesses of the secondary wave. Second, the 'New Economy' followed the general contours of a Schumpeterian business cycle. In the early 1990s, capital investments which implemented innovations in information technology and telecommunications initiated a primary wave growth spurt. By the late 1990s, a secondary wave of general prosperity was in full swing, with the characteristic features of 'reckless' finance and speculative excesses much in evidence. With the recession that ended the cycle in 2001 came the characteristic phenomena of deflation from excess capacity, a sharp decrease in capital investment spending, an excessive tightening of credit, plunging stock prices, and bankruptcies of a host of 'New Economy' corporations, including such giants as Enron and Global Crossing.
Overview
We begin in Section 2 with a review of Greenspan's defence of modern financial innovations. In Section 3, we explain why Schumpeter's business cycle analyses suggest that the major impacts of financial innovations would be in the secondary wave of speculative prosperity, rather than in the primary growth wave as Greenspan has asserted. We also note the similarity to Veblen's theory of speculative prosperity and financial panics. In Section 4, we present the case that modern financial innovations did contribute to speculative excesses and financial instability in the 'New Economy'. In Section 5, we argue that Schumpeter's dislike of financial speculation and 'reckless' banking would lead him to favour greater regulation of financial derivatives to curb their use by banks, other financial institutions and corporations such as Enron.
Greenspan's defence of modern financial innovations
Greenspan joined with others in suggesting that the US economy in the first half of the 1990s had entered into a period of technological innovations such as appears only once every 50 or 100 years (1999B). The resulting increased productivity and greater efficiency in the allocation of resources enabled the 'New Economy' to grow faster and maintain low unemployment rates while holding inflationary pressures in check. (His critics have charged that the public accepted the 'New Economy' thesis, leading to a belief that high stock prices were rational, in large part because Greenspan gave it credibility (see Cassidy 2002, p. 323).) But Greenspan asserted that financial innovations were also responsible for the emergence of the 'New Economy', providing 'net benefits for the majority of the American people' and significantly contributing to 'America's accelerated economic growth' (Greenspan, 2000C) . It is particularly noteworthy that he declared that financial derivatives, which are by far the most controversial of the modern financial innovations, led to a more efficient allocation of real capital facilities, improving national productivity and raising standards of living (Greenspan, 1999A) . And he expressed confidence that the pace of innovation in the financial sector will increase, with virtually no limit to the possible types of new products and services that will be offered by financial institutions (Greenspan, 2000C).
Financial derivatives
By implementing new information and communications technologies, some of these financial innovations have altered the operational processes in financial markets. They have reduced transactions costs by increasing the speed and volume capacity of the financial market infrastructure, i.e., the trading, payment, clearance and settlement systems (Greenspan, 2000F) . But, as Greenspan noted, the most significant change in the financial sector of the 'New Economy' has been in the 'extraordinary' development and expansion of new financial derivative products (1999A). These fall into two categories-standardised contracts that trade on organised exchanges and over-the-counter (OTC) contracts between private parties.
Exchange-traded derivatives in the form of financial futures and options contracts on currencies, US treasury securities, and stock indexes are subject to regulations by governmental agencies. The most rapid growth, however, has been in the unregulated custom-designed or over-the-counter derivatives, especially those in the form of interest rate or currency swap agreements. By the late 1990s, the notional value of interest rate swaps in the global economy was approximately $80 trillion, with an annual compound growth rate in the 1990s of 20%. US commercial banks and investment banks together were holding 40% of the world's derivatives (25% and 15%, respectively), the bulk of which were the unregulated OTC variety. US commercial banks had exchange-traded derivatives with notional values of $4 trillion, and $29 trillion of non-exchange-traded derivatives (Greenspan, 1999A).
Greenspan's 'Schumpeterian' interpretation
In his commentaries on the 'New Economy', Greenspan has hailed unfettered market capitalism as giving maximum opportunity to the innovational processes that unleash Schumpeter's process of 'creative destruction' in product and financial markets. Others have identified the impact of innovations in information technologies and telecommunications as a case of Schumpeter's process of 'creative destruction' in progress (see, for example, Whalen, 2000; Nakamura, 2000) . But Greenspan stands virtually alone in insisting that the rapid development of new financial instruments 'represents an acceleration of the process that noted economist Joseph Schumpeter many years ago termed ''creative destruction ''' (Greenspan, 2000F) . In one of his strongest statements, he declared that with banks allowed to take on more risks associated with financing high-growth strategies, unfettered by government regulations, Schumpeter's '''perennial gale of creative destruction'' is at the heart of our robust, growth-oriented economy' (Greenspan, 1997C) .
While Greenspan has offered the standard argument that financial derivatives are used to hedge against risk, he has acknowledged that a major reason for the rapidly growing use of unregulated OTC derivatives by banks and non-bank corporations was to enhance their profit margins. In contrast to those who see these developments as being 'worrisome and even deeply troubling' (2000C), Greenspan denied that the amount of risk exposure being assumed by financial institutions poses any systemic danger to the financial sector. In speaking against a proposal by the chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission for greater regulation of derivatives, he declared that 'private market regulation appears to be achieving public policy objectives quite effectively and efficiently' (1997A). Indeed, he subsequently went even further, calling for reducing or eliminating the current regulations on exchange-traded derivatives because the 'largest banks' regard those regulations 'as creating more burdens than benefits' (1999A).
Financial innovations in a Schumpeterian business cycle
Obviously, process and product innovations have contributed to an expansion in the financial resources sector of the national economy on both an absolute and a relative basis, with more people employed in that sector, more instruments in use, and a larger volume of trades and contracts of much larger values. Developments in information and communication technology have led to changes in the financial sector's infrastructure, allowing information to be gathered and processed much more rapidly and transactions to be settled much more quickly. That has facilitated rapid growth in the financial sector through reconfiguration of financial institutions and the development of new financial products. But neither Greenspan's claim that financial innovations have been Schumpeterian-type innovations responsible for a growth spurt and increased efficiency in the real economy nor his opposition to regulation of financial derivatives finds support in Schumpeter's discussions of the financial sector in The Theory of Economic Development and Business Cycles.
While finance does play an important role in Schumpeter's theory of business cycles and economic development, financial innovations were not included in the list of innovations that produce primary growth waves. Those were: (1) introducing a new good or quality of a good; (2) introducing a new method of production, (3) opening a new market, (4) developing a new source of raw materials or half-manufactured goods, and (5) a new organisation of any industry, including monopolising an existing one or breaking up an existing monopoly position (1961, p. 66) . Consequently, the role of financial innovations must be inferred from Schumpeter's theoretical and historical analyses of developments in the financial sector in the primary and secondary waves of the business cycle.
3.1 Finance and financial innovations in the primary growth wave Schumpeter drew a clear distinction between the entrepreneurs whose innovations create the conditions for profitable new enterprises and the bankers who create credit to finance the construction of the new ventures (1939, p. 328) . He emphasised heavily that the special role of credit-creation by bankers was 'the monetary complement of innovations ' (1939, p. 111, emphasis added). As independent agents who have no proprietary interest in the new enterprises they finance, bankers are the capitalists who bear all the risks (none is borne by the entrepreneurs). That requires having the special ability to judge the potential for success in financing entrepreneurial activities. Schumpeter emphasised that it is just as important to deny credit to those lacking that potential as it is to supply credit to those having it: 'Like economists, bankers are worth their salt only if they make themselves thoroughly unpopular with governments, politicians, and the public ' (1939, p. 118) .
But in the imperfect real world, the ability to determine which entrepreneurial ventures deserve credit is rare, and bankers do bear part of the risk. Schumpeter observed that the failure of the 'corporate' body of bankers to exercise that ability 'accounts for most of the events which the majority of observers would call ''catastrophes'' ' (1939, pp. 116-17) . John Law was cited as a historical illustration of the importance of keeping separate the functions of bankers and entrepreneurs. On the one hand, Law was entrepreneurial in starting the Mississippi Company. But he wanted to also be a capitalist, using his bank to create the money necessary for financing his entrepreneurial ventures. Schumpeter declared that Law's attempt to become banker-entrepreneur 'necessarily violates the structural idea of capitalism ' (1939, p. 251 , emphasis added).
Schumpeter's brief discussions of historical episodes of innovations in the field of banking might appear to suggest a positive role for financial innovations in financing the entrepreneurial ventures that produce the primary wave growth spurts. The spread of jointstock banking was cited as one of the most important innovations that occurred in the early 1800s (1939, p. 278) . A particularly interesting allusion to innovations in the banking sector is found in Schumpeter's discussion of the banking acts of the 1930s. He stated that the 1933 act introduced 'important reforms' (1939, p. 987, emphasis added), which included the strengthening the Federal Reserve's power to regulate member banks' extension of credit for speculative purposes and the separation of commercial banks and their security affiliates. (Deposit insurance was described as being the most important (ibid.).) Subsequently, Schumpeter stated that the 1935 banking act 'codified and made permanent the chief innovations previously introduced ' (1939, p. 1027, emphasis added) . That the 'reforms' in the banking sector implemented by the 1933 act became 'innovations' in the 1935 act has an important normative implication, as we shall note in Section 5.
But even if financial innovations can induce major changes in the banking sector, Schumpeter denied that banks could be the prime movers in a business cycle, for two reasons. First, bankers normally cannot take the initiative in their business with customers, but rather act passively (and with appropriate reserve) in financing ventures (1939, pp. 640-2). As we shall note later, Schumpeter argued that when banks have attempted to take the initiative, the consequence was 'reckless banking' which leads to financial excesses and conditions for financial crises in the secondary wave of speculative prosperity.
Second, financial innovations are not needed to finance entrepreneurial ventures that merit credit because banks are never limited in their ability to lend (1939, p. 606) . While being 'sold out' represents success for regular business firms, bankers do not typically want to be 'loaned up'. Schumpeter declared that 'Customers' business can not be handled safely and comfortably unless each bank has a generous allowance of unutilised lending power ' (1939, p. 641 ).
Schumpeter did state that 'riskiness' makes it more difficult for entrepreneurs to obtain the necessary credit from bankers to carry out their innovations (1939, p. 104, fn.) . Even so, it is questionable whether financial innovations would lead banks to finance more entrepreneurial ventures by reducing either of the two risks that regulate the supply of credit by banks.
Banks eliminate the risk of failure of the entrepreneurial ventures from consideration by additions to the interest rate (1961, p. 195) . Presumably, if financial innovations had the effect of reducing the default risk, bankers would lower their lending rates and more entrepreneurial ventures would qualify for credit. But Schumpeter argued that interest rates have little impact on the financing of entrepreneurial ventures, noting that new investment primarily occurs when rates are relatively high and in some situations not at all, even at a zero rate of interest (1939, p. 604) . In cycles induced by innovations, the demand curve for funds 'shifts violently' with changes in expectations about entrepreneurial profits as production functions change (1939, p. 603) . Indeed, Schumpeter charged that economists erred by not recognising that 'in the cyclical process shifts and distortions in the schedule of demand for balances are much more important than movements along it ' (1939, p. 604) .
The second risk that bankers consider is the loss of purchasing power due to inflation. Modern financial innovations that can be used to hedge against interest rate risk essentially provide some hedge against inflation. A financial futures contract on treasury bonds, for example, can hedge against the loss of market value of loans (i.e., repayment in dollars with diminished purchasing power), since interest rates usually rise with inflation. In that case, it might seem that banks would be more willing to lend to entrepreneurs. But again there are complications because Schumpeter would probably view that type of lending as contributing to the 'easy money' that produces inflation in the secondary wave of general prosperity.
Finance and financial innovations in the secondary wave
Entrepreneurs' spending for labour and new plant and equipment to launch their new ventures induces a secondary wave of prosperity that spreads over the entire economic system (Schumpeter, 1961, p. 226) . As the psychological effects of prosperity spread, irrational expectations and speculative activities of all types become increasingly common. Consumption spending stimulated by the temporary rises in personal incomes continues to increase as households expect incomes will continue to rise. Similarly, investment spending initially rises as existing firms expand production capacities in response to the entrepreneurs' orders for producers' goods, and some firms implement 'induced innovations' as copies or spin-offs of the original innovations (Schumpeter, 1939, p. 101, fn) . But it continues to rise, and many speculative business ventures are launched, based on erroneous expectations that prices and profits will continue to rise. Invariably, pure financial speculation appears and may intensify into a speculative mania. In Schumpeter's words: 'Many things float on this 'secondary wave', without any new or direct impulse from the real driving force, and speculative anticipation in the end acquires a causal significance ' (1961, p. 226, emphasis added) .
The financial sector plays a major role in the secondary wave because the bulk of the spending is debt-financed, with credit creation spreading throughout the system to finance any kind of expansion that cannot be financed with existing funds (1939, p. 159) . Debt arising from credit created to finance the innovations and business expansions that increase productivity is 'productive' debt. But credit created in the secondary wave for consumers, speculative businesses and financial speculators, results in a build-up of 'unproductive' debt, which is primarily induced by 'easy' money and results in the problem of 'overindebtedness ' (1939, p. 147) . The role of bankers acting as knowledgeable and disciplined assessors of the potential success of entrepreneurial ventures gives way to 'reckless' lending, 'financing irresponsibly ' (1939, p. 635) . With the creation of credit being 'easy', speculative forces drive the economy, with each loan tending to induce another and each rise in prices inducing another rise. In extreme cases, great speculative manias develop in the financial markets, such as occurred in 1928-29.
Since banks acting 'responsibly' do not fully use their ability to finance productive entrepreneurial ventures, the general tendency for financial innovations is to increase the financing of highly speculative business ventures and pure financial speculation. Historical examples that illustrate this tendency include Law's scheme to convert the French national debt into shares of the Mississippi Company (1939, p. 251 ) and the great speculative booms in the US associated with 'railroadisation ' (1939, p. 325) . In the latter case, several new types of securities came into heavy play. For example, bank loans were made to promoters against bonds or notes that were to be sold later. Arrangements were made for companies controlled by promoters to carry bonds of the new company being promoted (1939, p. 331) . Other common practices included the sale of options on land with payment taken in securities rather than cash, and offering common stocks as bonuses on the purchase of bonds (1939, p. 335) .
The collapse of the secondary wave of speculative prosperity is induced by the same factors that bring the primary wave to an end in a process of deflation and recession. Entrepreneurs' investment outlays cease once they have acquired the inputs and industrial plant to make their innovational ventures operational. At the same time, the productivity increases resulting from their innovations lower production costs, putting a downward pressure on prices that is transmitted in competitive markets to other firms. In addition, there are the 'creative destruction' effects, as various firms and industries are rendered obsolete by changing demands and production techniques.
While deflation and liquidation in the recession phase in a business cycle are normal adaptation phenomena, the severity of the downturn is amplified because the mass of 'unproductive' debt and speculative excesses result in much more liquidation and adjustment than is economically warranted (1939, p. 148) . Bankers switch abruptly from being 'reckless' in their lending to being overly cautious, as the survival interest of individual banks leads each to tighten credit excessively (1939, p. 643) . As a consequence, many enterprises that should have survived are liquidated because they are denied credit (1939, pp. 148-51) .
'Reckless finance' and speculative excesses in the New Economy
Ironically, even as Greenspan was praising the alleged 'Schumpeterian' effect of financial innovations on the growth rate and allocative efficiency in the 'New Economy', he was also expressing concern over what we recognise as characteristic features of a secondary wave in a Schumpeterian business cycle. Greenspan's warnings about 'irrational exuberance' in stock prices (1996) , historically high consumer debt and the 'wealth effect' of rising stock prices on consumption spending (2000B) essentially echoed Schumpeter's criticism of the speculative mania of 1929 as a period of 'wild excesses' and 'abnormal' financial practices in which consumption spending was being encouraged by capital gains on stocks (1951, p. 214) . What Schumpeter termed 'reckless banking' was indicated in Greenspan's warning that banks were easing 'terms and standards on business loans' (1997A) and 'should now pause and reassess the appropriateness of their lending decisions' (1997B). Lending based on erroneous expectations was indicated in a Federal Reserve guidance letter to banks about 'indications of departures from proven sound lending practices-in particular, overreliance on optimistic views of the borrowers' prospects and favourable economic and financial conditions' (Federal Reserve, 1999) .
The sudden weakening of the 'New Economy' in 2000-01 conformed to the manner in which a Schumpeterian business cycle ends. The increased productivity and reduced labour costs resulting from the technological innovations responsible for the primary wave of growth combined with excess capacity in technology industries began to exert an implicit deflationary effect (see Greenspan, 2000B, 2001 . A precipitous decline in business capital outlays occurred in part because the original innovations had been implemented, but also because financial conditions changed. In characteristic fashion, banks began to tighten credit to business firms excessively (see Sherer and Sapsford, 2000) , to the extent that Greenspan cautioned them against denying credit 'to borrowers with credible prospects ' (2000G) . The deflationary effects of the implemented innovations combined with credit tightening by banks exposed the speculative basis of the prosperity, particularly for the speculative business ventures, e.g., dot.com companies, and the speculative bubble in NASDAQ stocks. 'Innovative' business ventures that had been viewed as highly promising suddenly were under tremendous pressure to prove their market values with earnings. A stock market that had become accustomed to analysts forecasting high corporate earnings based on expected gains in productivity was suddenly facing a tide of disappointing earnings reports, and the 'irrational exuberance' evaporated very quickly.
The following case examples illustrate how modern financial innovations have contributed to financial instability and speculative excesses.
Junk bonds and leveraged buyouts in the 1980s
While junk bonds and leveraged buyouts pre-dated the 1980s, McCauley et al. (1999, p. 21 ) noted that they became process innovations in that decade by being put to a new use in takeovers. Additional innovations made junk bond issuers able to carry a heavier burden of interest-payment-in-kind bonds (holders received paper IOUs twice annually rather than cash) and zero-coupon bonds (McCauley et al., 1999, p. 33) . Defenders of junk bonds contend that efficiency gains were realised through the mergers and acquisitions they facilitated. If the corporate reorganisations had achieved efficiency gains and were possible only because junks bonds provided the financing, they would qualify as Schumpeterian process innovations similar to the mergers of the late 1800s, which used the holding company that he included as innovations. But using a Minsky-Kindleberger model, McCauley et al. (1999) have presented an analysis which exposes the leveraging wave of the 1980s as a financial market mania (pp. 13-61).
Financial derivatives and financial instability
As we noted in Section 2, the most important (and most controversial) modern financial innovations have been derivative instruments. Several case examples of financial crises or near-crises in which new derivative instruments have been identified as contributing factors illustrate why Schumpeter would regard these modern financial innovations with some trepidation.
First, portfolio insurance and stock index futures contracts were financial innovations that have been identified as contributing to the stock market crash of 1987. By creating a false sense of confidence that downside risk was dynamically hedged by computerised programmes selling stock index futures when the prices of stocks in the cash market fell, portfolio insurance encouraged institutional funds to take on more risk in their portfolios of stocks. When stock prices started falling on 19 October 1987, portfolio insurance programmes sold stock index futures contracts, driving the prices down. But stock index arbitrage computerised programmes responded by substituting stock index futures for stocks, and their selling in the cash market drove stock prices lower. The result was the so-called 'cascade effect', with the interaction between the two computerised programmes and the new link between stock index futures contracts and prices of stocks in the cash market creating a wave of selling that overwhelmed the market. Panic selling then ensued to create the largest single day stock market crash in history. (For more detailed explanation, see Raines and Leathers, 1994.) A second case example is the collapse of the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) hedge fund in 1998, a crisis that was averted only by the New York Federal Reserve Bank organising large banks to bail out the fund. LTCM had heavily leveraged its operations with loans from large banks, which Schumpeter would surely regard as an example of the worst type of 'reckless banking'. Greenspan (1998C) reported that LTCM had 'levered its capital through securities repurchase contracts and derivatives transactions'. To make matters worse, banks that had done business with LTCM often mimicked its strategy in their own proprietary trading. In addition to taking short positions in various securities to hedge long positions in other securities, LTCM hedged again with 'a plethora of complex derivatives' (Tudor, 2000, p. 139) . With LTCM using derivatives so arcane that even some of the people at the fund did not understand them, the spread of the Asian financial crisis and the collapse of the Russian financial system led to massive losses on those contracts.
The position of this single unregulated, highly secretive fund was such that its collapse was regarded by the Federal Reserve as capable of generating substantial damage to the world's financial markets by a 'firesale' of its assets (Greenspan, 1998C) . Greenspan faulted banks for failing to assess the 'uncollateralised exposure' to risk in volatile and illiquid markets (1998C). But the banks involved were exhibiting behavioural tendencies that occur in a Schumpeterian secondary wave of general prosperity. Undoubtedly, their willingness to lend to LTCM without knowing what the fund was doing was encouraged by the false sense of confidence that this particular financial innovation (the hedge fund) could continue to reap abnormal returns by using other financial innovations (derivatives). Greenspan noted that financial innovations developed to realise above-normal profits quickly lose their differential advantages, because they are quickly emulated, which he regards as producing and expanding the standard of living by the 'winnowing of inefficiencies ' (1998C) . In view of the LTCM case, Schumpeter would no doubt observe that this could lead to a frantic process of introducing financial innovations for the purpose of realising these monetary gains without fully understanding the consequences.
Enron's collapse further illustrates the evolving dangers of the complex use of esoteric unregulated over-the-counter derivative instruments. Enron began as an energy company in the 1980s, but had become primarily an OTC derivatives trading firm by the end of the 1990s (Partnoy, 2002, p. 2) . At first, Enron was trading in energy derivatives, but became primarily a trader in highly esoteric OTC financial derivatives called 'price-swaps', 'makewhole derivatives', and 'credit derivatives' that even the experts found difficult to understand. Only brief descriptions can be offered here.
In 'price-swaps', Enron exchanged shares that it owned in speculative technology companies for loans from specially created limited partnerships, which in turn issued securities of their own to investors and held the cash received. Enron was committed to maintaining the value of the limited partnerships' assets (the shares of the technology companies) by giving its own stock to the limited partnerships. When the shares of the technology companies plummeted in value, Enron had to give more of its stock to the limited partnerships, and as Enron shares decreased in value, the number of shares transferred increased. But the derivative arrangements kept Enron's losses from appearing in its financial statements (see Partnoy, 2002) .
Credit derivatives seemingly could be used to reduce the risk of default on loans, which as we noted in Section 3 was one of the two risks that Schumpeter's bankers considered in making loans to entrepreneurs. In a credit derivative, a bank holding loans that it thinks might not be repaid pays another party to assume the default risk (buys a credit derivative). The sellers of credit derivatives are assuming the risk of potentially large payouts, and tend to be the very largest banks that can absorb large defaults without going bankrupt. (Seven banks handle over 90% of the total credit derivative business.) The banks buying the derivatives can keep the loans on their books without telling large corporate borrowers that it has doubts about their credit ratings, thereby maintaining good relationships with those clients. Enron was able to enter into credit derivatives by persuading Congress not to regulate such derivatives and gaining the necessary high credit ratings that are required to be involved in these contracts by hiding billions of dollars of debt in off-balance-sheet partnerships. While it is not clear how much credit derivatives contributed to Enron's collapse, at least $3 billion worth of those derivatives were thrown into limbo (see Cave, 2002) .
By using the esoteric OTC derivatives, Enron was able to hide huge losses on technology stocks and huge debts incurred from unprofitable businesses, and to inflate the value of some of its assets (Partnoy, 2002) . On the balance sheet, it appeared to be making billions trading derivatives, when in fact it was losing billions in its 'real' businesses. When Enron became the largest corporate bankruptcy in history in December 2001, stockholders and employees lost billions in stock value, and public confidence in the financial activities and the accounting profession suffered major damage. That Enron should not be viewed as an isolated case was made clear in testimony at a Congressional hearing: 'The temptations associated with derivatives have proved too great for many companies, and Enron is no exception' (Partnoy, 2002, p. 22) .
Even after the collapses of LTCM and Enron, Greenspan has continued to laud the rapidly expanding role of financial derivatives and oppose their regulation. In acknowledging that concerns over systemic problems from the vast expansion of derivatives were renewed by the Enron failure, he argued that, even though Enron and LTCM were major players in the derivatives markets, their problems were 'readily traceable to an old fashion excess of debt, however acquired' (Greenspan, 2002) . He continued to oppose regulation, declaring that 'the market's reaction to the revelations about Enron provides encouragement that the force of market discipline can be counted on over time ' (Greenspan, 2002) .
The failure of Barings is perhaps a smaller example, but one that again illustrates the type of financial excesses encouraged by use of financial derivatives. Greenspan noted that the efficiency of the new financial technology and products that has increased the productivity and efficiency of capital markets has also significantly improved 'the potential for more rapid and widespread disruption' by 'transmitting mistakes at a far faster pace through the financial system' (1997D). The failure of Barings was cited as illustrating how a single trader can generate such enormous losses so quickly.
Current exposure of banks to derivative risks
As we noted in Section 2, the exposure of US commercial banks to financial derivatives increased rapidly during the 1990s. Even while speaking of this as a positive development, Greenspan noted 'episodes of extreme volatility' in 'the most leveraged' of those contracts (1999A), and conceded that the rapid growth and increasing importance of derivative instruments in the risk profiles of many large banks had become a particular concern (2000C). In January 2001, rumours of derivative losses by Bank of America caused trading in its shares to be temporarily suspended and became a major factor in Greenspan's decision to reduce the federal funds rate (The Economist, 2001) . Even so, the notional value of derivatives in the portfolios of insured commercial banks in the US grew by $3.4 trillion to a total of $43.9 trillion in the first quarter of 2001 (OCC Bank Derivatives Report, 2001) , five times total bank assets. Seven US banks held 96%, while 25 banks held 99%.
A Schumpeterian perspective on regulating use of financial derivatives
That raises the question of whether Schumpeter would agree with Greenspan's opposition to government regulation of financial derivatives, especially their use by banks. On a purely operational basis, Schumpeter would approve of process innovations in 'electronic finance' which increase the speed and efficiency of the operational processes of gathering and processing information by financial institutions and in the transfer of funds and settling accounts. He would also approve of the use of financial derivatives to do legitimate hedging, as indicated in the following statements about the need for 'protecting devices'.
Practically any investment entails, as a necessary complement of entrepreneurial action, certain safeguarding activities as insuring or hedging. Long-range investing under rapidly changing conditions, especially under conditions that change or may change at any moment under the impact of new commodities and technologies, is like shooting at a target that is not only indistinct but moving-and moving jerkily at that. (Schumpeter, 1950, p. 88) But he would regard modern financial innovations that were introduced to circumvent regulations on banks in a much less favourable light. As we noted in Section 3, Schumpeter viewed the regulations imposed by the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935 (1939, pp. 987, 1027) with strong approval. Moreover, he repeatedly criticised 'reckless banking', which he defined as 'granting loans without regard to the borrowers' ability to repay', and which he classed with 'speculative manias, swindle, and the like ' (1939, pp. 260-1; see also p. 322) . 'Wildcat banking' had historically accounted for most of the economic 'catastrophes ' (1939, p. 117 ). Schumpeter's concern over the consequences of irresponsible behaviour of banks in the 1920s is particularly noteworthy. Their creation of money by making loans to buyers of bonds and stocks 'in the midst of rioting stock markets' had 'seriously and perhaps permanently' impaired the 'steering and balancing parts of the capitalist machine ' (1939, p. 861) .
Schumpeter would take an equally negative view of the use of financial derivatives in financial speculation. In Business Cycles, he observed that 'The path that leads from the financial sector to real investment is tortuous and unsafe ' (1939, p. 885) . That was largely because of the financial speculation which occurs in the secondary wave of general prosperity. Schumpeter's intense dislike of financial speculation was indicated repeatedly in citations of historical examples of 'reckless finance' and speculative excesses. He disagreed with those economists, including Alfred Marshall, who had maintained that the Bubble Act (enacted by the British Parliament after the South Sea Company bubble) had handicapped British economic evolution until its repeal in 1825. Schumpeter declared that 'a perfectly good case' could be made that the act 'hardly prevented more than it was intended to prevent, namely speculative excesses ' (1939, p. 248, fn., emphasis added) . Similarly, he described the Securities Act of 1933 as 'a sober and well-drafted piece of legislation ' (1939, p. 986) . In discussing the financial aspects of the merger boom in the 1890s (those mergers were legitimate innovations), Schumpeter stated that it stimulated the prevalent propensity to gamble (1939, p. 403) . The Union Pacific case in 1906 was described as involving a deliberate fostering of a speculative craze that had already set in, which banks did not resist in their lending. Schumpeter commented that the private interest of those savers who bought common stock would in many cases have been better served by a game of poker (1939, pp. 408-9) .
Like Keynes, Schumpeter viewed Americans as being especially inclined toward speculation, declaring that 'sociopsychological attitudes' differed between European and American businessmen. Americans were still subject to re-assertions of 'the spirit of pioneer times' of earlier America, which 'asserts itself in an impulsive belief in increasing rates of growth, particularly of capital values ' (1939, p. 5) . He added 'The same spirit manifests itself in the naïve enjoyment of prosperities and ''new eras'' and in corresponding dejection if the shocking disaster of depression occurs. It is a real factor in shaping those secondary phenomena, which we have a right to attribute to ''psychology''' (1939, p. 5) . In his analysis of the 1920s, Schumpeter described the 'speculative mania of 1927-1929' as involving 'wild excesses and attendant financial practices' that 'were clearly abnormal', which could only be explained 'by a specifically American mass psychology ' (1951, p. 214) . Similarly, he suggested that speculative manias were more American than European, that speculative excesses cannot be controlled by interest-rate and credit-rationing policies, but rather by other means (1951, p. 311) .
From that perspective, a major problem with modern financial innovations is the psychological effect of making bankers feel that the risk has been reduced, when in fact, much of the risk is simply not known. The Economist (2001) noted that, as the derivatives markets were showing stress, not even the Fed had a clear understanding of which institutions were bearing the bulk of the risks. Even while essentially downplaying the possibility that 'systemic risk' has been increased by the use of derivatives, Greenspan has recognised the uncertainty about the amount of exposure to risk. In stating that 'in evaluating derivatives risk, far more stress testing of the lower probability outcomes is a necessity', he acknowledged that 'ostensibly low probability events' were 'low' only based on possibly erroneous assumptions (1999A).
There can be no doubt that Schumpeter would be in favour of regulating financial innovations to reduce the potential for use in speculative activities. Characteristically blending moral and economic objections, he lamented that 'the evolution of an environment's system of moral ideas and legal safeguards tends to lag behind its economic evolution ' (1939, p. 410) . He defended Germany's 1896 law aimed at curbing speculation in the commodities market and the stock market. The 'official disapproval of gambling' that the law conveyed was 'highly significant ' (1939, p. 437 ). More might have been accomplished, but the German public having 'both the means and inclination to speculate' was being 'led on by a haute finance, that was chronically under the compulsion of unloading securities, much in the same way as in the United States ' (1939, p. 437) . Schumpeter made his position on stock market speculation very clear in the statement that:
[t]his view, together with some of the propositions that are to follow, is often taken to imply 'friendliness' to, or an intention to 'defend', stock speculation. In order to dispel any such suspicion, the writer begs leave to state than on moral, political and cultural grounds he personally welcomes almost any measure in any way hostile to it, regardless of economic circumstances. In particular, he would welcome an enactment making speculation a misdemeanor for members of certain professions. (1939, pp. 681-2) That raises the question of the limits of regulation that Schumpeter would find acceptable in a capitalist system. In his 'March Into Socialism' speech, Schumpeter cited 'a rich assortment of regulative measures' and 'public control' over the money market as anticapitalist developments in the trend toward centralised socialism (1950, p. 418) . But on the other hand, he recognised that there was a need for 'rational' regulations. The general case for that type of regulation was presented within the context of his defence of monopolies gained through entrepreneurial successes.
our argument does not amount to a case against state regulation. It does show that there is no general case for indiscriminate 'trust-busting' or for the prosecution of everything that qualifies as a restraint of trade. Rational as distinguished from vindictive regulation by public authority turns out to be an extremely delicate problem which not every government agency, particularly when in full cry against big business, can be trusted to solve. (1950, p. 91, emphasis added) Elsewhere, he addressed more specifically regulation of the financial sector to deal with speculative bubbles. Rather than blaming and punishing individuals when bubbles burst, he argued that It is more rational that people should insist on measures for regulating and purifying financial practice. The ways of speculation, the responsibilities of promoters and managers, the methods of banking are the chief objects of such legislation. Broadly we may say that while most of these measures, as the historian surveys them, went too far in some respects, and were ineffective in others, and while many of them made immediate recovery more difficult, they have justified themselves on balance and have succeeded in improving what they were meant to improve. (1951, p. 116, emphasis added) Schumpeter emphasised that 'reckless' banking and financial speculation which made the depression much worse could be, and should be, separated from the dynamic 'creative destruction' process of innovation by 'a sufficiently powerful and intelligent government assisted by a properly organised banking system ' (1961, p. 310) .
Conclusions and implications
The major points developed in this paper and their policy implications may be summarised as follows. First, we have explained that, from a Schumpeterian business cycle perspective, financial innovations could not have induced a technology-led growth spurt in the 'New Economy' as Greenspan has claimed. Rather, the primary role of modern financial innovations was to contribute to the 'reckless' finance and speculative excesses of the secondary wave of the 'New Economy's' business cycle. Accordingly, a policy of early intervention will be most effective if the use of financial derivatives by financial institutions and non-financial corporations is subject to 'rational' regulation.
That leads to the second point, which relates to the type of policy intervention that would be appropriate. Greenspan's case for leaving financial innovations unregulated is not supported by Schumpeter's theory of innovations and business cycles. While Greenspan appears to perceive Schumpeter as a doctrinaire advocate of laissez faire capitalism, we have shown that was not the case. To curb the potential of modern financial innovations to be used in speculative activities, Schumpeter would view as 'rational' policy such measures as reversing the exemption of over-the-counter derivatives from regulation and extending current SEC regulation of investment banks' dealings in credit derivatives to non-banking firms. On a broader basis, the speculative use of financial innovations has gone hand in hand with deregulation of financial institutions and markets. In repealing the law that separated commercial and investment banking, an action supported by Greenspan,
